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I. Letter from Secretary-General

II. Letter from Under-Secretary-General

Esteemed Delegates,

First of all, I would like to welcome all of you to the FilizMUN'26!

I am Alperen Belek and I will be serving as your Under-Secretary-General for this year's conference on the UNIDIR committee.

This year, UNIDIR welcomes you as a specialized committee with high energy and an unceasing pace. So get ready, because with this comprehensive study guide you'll be preparing for what might be the most exciting and impressive committee at the conference.

This year's agenda focuses on ‘’Addressing the Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems and Strengthening International Arms Control’’. As autonomous technologies continue to transform the nature of modern warfare, strengthening international cooperation and establishing effective regulations to address the humanitarian, legal and security challenges posed by autonomous weapon systems is becoming increasingly important. As Chairboard, we look forward to seeing your passion, dedication, and energy throughout the committee. Also, enjoy every moment and make this experience one to remember…

Lastly, I would like to thank my Secretary-General Zeynep Kayalaçin for supporting us until now.

With all my best,

Alperen Belek

Under-Secretary-General responsible for United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

III. Introduction to the Committee: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research



The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is an autonomous institution within the United Nations that conducts independent research on disarmament, arms control and international security. Established in 1980, the Institute offers its Member States and the international community research, analysis and policy-oriented expertise on a wide range of current and future security challenges. [1]

UNIDIR also promotes dialog and supports international efforts to develop practical approaches to disarmament and arms control. The Institute's work covers emerging military technologies and autonomous weapons systems and is thus particularly relevant to discussions of the security, legal and strategic implications of increasingly autonomous technologies. [2]

In this committee, delegates will examine the risks involved in AWS and discuss how the international framework for arms control can be enhanced to tackle these risks. Issues of human control, accountability, international humanitarian law, transparency and verification and international cooperation will be the issues under consideration, taking into account the different views that states have on the subject matter during multilateral negotiations. [3]

IV. Introductuion to the Agenda Item: Addressing the Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems and Strengthening International Arms Control

A. Overview of the Agenda

Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) are emerging as a topic for international security and arms control discussions. There are different degrees of human involvement in the use of force functions that these systems can perform. How can responsibility, predictability and compliance with international law be ensured as military autonomy develops? International discussions have thus increasingly concentrated on the relationship between autonomy, human judgment and control. [4]

For over a decade, States have been discussing the implications of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The discussions have focused on issues such as the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), human control, accountability, legal reviews, risk mitigation and possible prohibitions or regulation. There is considerable common ground, but important differences remain over the form and scope of future international regulation. [4]

The agenda is therefore based on two interlinked goals: addressing the risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems and strengthening international arms control mechanisms. This includes looking at how States can improve transparency, accountability, human judgment and control, verification and international cooperation in developing appropriate international standards for emerging autonomous weapon technologies. Recent UNIDIR work continues to explore these questions through both legal analysis and realistic operational scenarios. [5]

B. Historical Background of the Agenda

1. Development of Autonomous Weapons

The development of the development of autonomous weapons systems has come out of the broader evolution of military automation, robotics and increasingly sophisticated sensing and computing technologies . Early systems were mainly employed to automate particular functions, such as navigation, detection and interception, but later developments improved the weapons platform's ability to process information and to perform functions with less human intervention. By the 2010s advances in robotics, sensors and computing had sharpened international interest in systems that could independently select and engage targets. [6]



The path to the development of autonomy has not been a single technological path. Autonomous functions have been integrated into air, land and maritime systems, although the degrees of autonomy differ among systems. UNIDIR identifies three broad approaches to understanding this development: the technical characteristics of a system, the role of humans in its operation, or the specific functions that a system can perform autonomously. [7]


International concern grew as technological developments started to raise questions about human control over the use of force. In 2011 the ICRC first formally raised concerns about autonomous weapons and in 2014 held an international expert meeting to examine their technical, military, legal and humanitarian implications. Later, the discussions in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) expanded and States began to consider

the implications of increasingly autonomous weapon systems. [8]

Since 2013, UNIDIR has been studying the technical characteristics and operational implications of increasingly autonomous weapons technologies, including possible approaches to international regulation. These developments have added to the wider international discussion on how autonomy in weapons should be defined, limited and governed while ensuring appropriate human responsibility and control. [7]

2. Emergence of International Debate

With the increasing autonomy of military technologies, there has been a debate over Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) internationally. The ICRC first expressed concerns about autonomous weapons in 2011, highlighting the legal, ethical and humanitarian questions raised by the use of weapons capable of performing critical functions with only limited human intervention. [6]



In 2014, the issue gained greater international attention when the ICRC convened an expert meeting with representatives of 21 States, independent experts and representatives of international organizations. The meeting considered the technological, military, legal and ethical implications of autonomous weapons and helped to move the issue into wider multilateral discussions. [6]

That year, States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) also started formally discussing emerging technologies related to lethal autonomous weapons

systems. Over the years, these discussions turned into the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS, established in 2016. The GGE has since discussed issues including human control, accountability, international humanitarian law and possible regulatory approaches. [9]

The international debate has continued to evolve, with States holding different views on whether existing international law is sufficient, whether new legally binding rules are needed and what limits should be placed on autonomous weapons. Consequently, the discussion has moved away from the understanding of the technology to what international standards, restrictions and arms-control measures are appropriate. [10]

3. Recent Developments

In recent years, international discussions on Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) have moved away from general concerns to more concrete approaches to regulation and arms control. Under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) States have continued to consider questions of human control, accountability, predictability and compliance with international humanitarian law. The Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS continued its work on elements of a possible international instrument and other measures to address emerging technologies in LAWS during its sessions in March and from 31 August to 4 September 2026. [11]

One important recent trend has been the growing trend of exploring autonomous weapons through concrete legal and operational cases. In 2026, UNIDIR came up with its Scenario Compendium for the Legal, Operational and Technical Analysis of Lethal Autonomous

Weapons Systems, which provides a number of concrete scenarios as well as guiding questions for analysis from the perspective of international humanitarian law. [5]

The international debate has increasingly focused on how to sustain human judgment and control in the development and use of autonomous weapons. Recent discussions have addressed the relationship between autonomy, international humanitarian law, accountability and the predictability of weapons systems, as part of a broader effort to translate general principles into concrete regulatory approaches. [12]

In August 2026, the UN Secretary-General and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross reiterated their appeal to States to develop new international norms on autonomous weapons, including explicit prohibitions and limitations. This appeal emphasized the significance of the CCW process that was underway and the necessity for States to proceed with developing international norms. [13]

C. Understanding Autonomous Weapons Systems


Understanding Autonomous Weapons Systems is crucial for identifying the capabilities and limitations of these technologies and assessing the risks they pose to international security. Understanding the difference between autonomous systems and automated weapons and comprehending the function of human control lays the foundation for considering their legal, ethical and humanitarian implications. This understanding is vital for the development of effective international standards and arms control measures.

1. Definition and Characteristics

Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) are weapon systems that, once activated, are able to select and attack targets without further intervention by a human operator. They make use of

sensors, software and information from the surroundings to recognize the potential targets against pre-defined criteria. There is no internationally agreed definition of autonomous weapons, and the level of autonomy can vary widely between systems. [8]

Autonomous functions can be added to weapon systems operating in the land, air and maritime environments. Such systems can be based on technologies from rule-based software to more advanced artificial intelligence. Their capabilities are dependent on how they process information, find targets and respond to changing environmental conditions. Not all autonomous weapons are the same, nor do they all operate with the same level of independence. [7]



EST. 2025


Another characteristic feature of autonomous weapons is the role of human beings in the decision-making process regarding force application. In case of remote-controlled machines, the force application decision is made by the human operator, but when it comes to autonomous machines, after activation they can identify and attack the target on their own without any human intervention. It is necessary to comprehend these features in order to

analyze the issues related to autonomous weapons. [14]

2. Autonomous vs. Automated Weapons

The difference between automated and autonomous weapons is largely related to the extent of independence they have in performing their tasks. Automated weapons act on the basis of set guidelines and instructions that define what action needs to be performed for a certain input or situation. The actions of automated weapons are confined to their pre-designed capabilities, like detecting a coming target and performing the designated task. In comparison, autonomous weapons have the capability to decide and engage targets by collecting information from the surroundings. [14]

However, the differences in the two systems are not clear-cut since weapon technologies range from low levels of autonomy to high ones. There are some weapon technologies which have an automated function while others have a higher degree of automation where the weapon technology can conduct target acquisition independently. The human operator's involvement is also not constant since it may either control each engagement or manage the system performing independently within given parameters. [8]



Such distinction is crucial to arms control on an international level as it affects the risk of using the weapon depending on its ability to choose and engage the target without human intervention. Such factors as predictability and control should be taken into account in the process of regulation and creating the international guidelines and limitations. It is crucial to make a clear distinction between these two terms.

[15]

3. Human Control

International discussions on Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) highlight human control as one of the central issues. This concerns the degree to which humans can understand, supervise and manage the decisions made by a weapon system, especially those involving the selection and engagement of targets. Autonomous weapons may carry out these functions, once activated, without further human intervention, unlike systems needing specific human approval for each engagement. This raises significant concerns about the extent of human involvement needed to guaranty the responsible use of force. [14]

Several factors are important for meaningful human control, including the predictability of a weapon system, the environment in which it operates, the length of time for which it is deployed and the ability of human operators to intervene where necessary. Effective supervision also requires that the operator understands the capabilities and limitations of the system and has sufficient information to make informed decisions. In practice, even if a person formally permits the system to be switched on, human participation might be reduced if these conditions are not met. [16]

The significance of human control is closely related to international humanitarian law, which obliges parties to armed conflict to differentiate between civilians and combatants and to take precautions to protect civilians from harm. States are still discussing how autonomous weapons should be covered by these legal obligations and if existing rules are sufficient to provide safeguards. It is therefore a key consideration in the development of international standards, restrictions and arms control measures for AWS to establish appropriate levels of human control. [14]

D. Risks Associated with Autonomous Weapons Systems

1. Accountability and Responsibility

A major concern in the development and use of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) is accountability and responsibility. When a weapon system autonomously selects and strikes a target without direct human involvement, it can become more difficult to ascertain who is responsible for its actions. Depending on their role and the circumstances of the incident, the potentially involved parties may include military commanders, operators, developers and States. However, the use of autonomous technology does not exempt States and individuals from their obligations to respect applicable international law. [14]

The question of establishing responsibility is one of the major difficulties since the action of such weapon could lead to unlawful injury. The actions of the system depend on such elements as its programming, sensor input, operating environment, and prior decisions. It makes it harder to trace back the cause of engagement and whether the necessary requirements of the law have been met. Proper documentation, appropriate oversight, and adequate testing are key to conducting investigations and determining responsibility. [4]

International humanitarian law requires states and parties to any armed conflict to make sure that the use of such weapon is consistent with the applicable laws. Specifically, according to Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, states are required to determine whether the development or adoption of a new weapon is forbidden by international law. As a result, the significance of the process of reviewing legal implications of autonomous weapons, chain of command, and possibility to review decisions is emphasized. [17]

2. Predictability and Reliability

Predictability and reliability are important issues surrounding autonomous weapon systems (AWS). These systems might react differently to changing environmental conditions, unexpected situations or inaccurate sensor data, making their behavior difficult to predict. So it is a major task to make sure that autonomous weapons do not operate outside their intended boundaries. [2]

Unpredictable behavior can increase the risk of unintended harm to civilians and make it more difficult to comply with international humanitarian law. Therefore, rigorous testing, adequate oversight by humans, and clear operational boundaries are key to mitigating risks. Another important issue in the continuing arms talks is establishing international standards for testing and reliability of autonomous weapons. [14]

3. Escalation and International Security

Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) may create new risks for international security by accelerating military decision-making and providing less time for human assessment. In situations of increased tensions, fast or unexpected reactions by autonomous systems may increase the risks of miscalculation, unintended confrontation and further escalation between States. These issues become especially significant when multiple autonomous systems operate in the same environment. [2]

Moreover, the increasing deployment of autonomous weapons might escalate military rivalry as States try to build up sophisticated technology to keep their strategic advantage. Without good communication, there can be many misunderstandings between States which will be

hard to resolve. It is important for international cooperation and proper arms control to take place to avoid escalation. [14]

4. International Humanitarian Law

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) sets out rules that limit the effects of armed conflict and protect civilians and others who are not participating in hostilities. These rules also apply to Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS), which must be used in compliance with the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. But the possibility that autonomous systems will select and engage targets without further human input gives rise to concerns about the ability to consistently meet these requirements. [18]



Among the issues facing the states is ensuring that autonomous weapons can differentiate between military and civilian targets, as well as the possible outcomes of the action taken. This process may be rather complicated due to the variable and complex conditions, which may prove hard to be interpreted by the system. The states thus keep discussing how to apply the current international law to autonomous weapons. [19]

E. International Arms Control and Regulatory Frameworks

1. Existing International Frameworks

International regulation of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) is based on existing international humanitarian law and multilateral arms control regimes. There is no single, comprehensive treaty that regulates all autonomous weapons, but the existing legal rules governing the conduct of hostilities and the use of weapons still apply. The 1949 Geneva

Conventions and their Additional Protocols offer essential protections in armed conflict, and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) provides a key venue for States to discuss the humanitarian and security implications of emerging weapons technologies. [18]



The CCW has been particularly important in international discussions on lethal autonomous weapon systems through its Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). Since 2014, states have examined questions relating to human control, accountability, compliance with international humanitarian law and possible regulatory measures. In 2019, the High Contracting Parties to the CCW reaffirmed the continued full applicability of international humanitarian law to all weapons systems, including those featuring autonomous functions. However, there are still differing views among States as to whether the current rules are sufficient or whether new legally binding international rules are necessary. [20]

These frameworks are crucial because they provide the legal basis and diplomatic avenues through which States may address the risks presented by autonomous weapons. They help to set up common principles, to make clear existing obligations and to open possibilities for international cooperation. However, differences in national positions and the absence of a dedicated, umbrella agreement leave important questions on prohibitions, restrictions and implementation unresolved. Strengthening these frameworks and evaluating whether further international rules are needed are thus central to the development of effective arms control measures for AWS. [4]

2. International Standards and Restrictions

The goal of international standards and constraints is to ensure that Autonomous Weapon

Systems (AWS) are developed and used in accordance with international law. Within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) States have emphasized the applicability of international humanitarian law to all weapon systems and the significance of upholding human responsibility and accountability. These principles provide an important foundation for the development of common international standards. [20]

Among potential regulatory steps are prohibiting systems that cannot meet international humanitarian law and constraining others with human supervision, legal assessments and safety trials. However, States remain divided on the scope of such restrictions and the need for a new legally binding international agreement. This leads to the need to develop effective standards for mitigating humanitarian risks and improving international arms control. [4]

3. Transparency and Verification



Transparency and verification play an important role in building up trust between States and compliance with arms control agreements internationally. In relation to Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS), disclosure of information relating to the capabilities of the system, testing process, and human supervision may be helpful in minimizing any misunderstanding. [21]



It is worth noting that it is not always easy to verify compliance since autonomous weapon systems have very advanced software and highly classified technologies. The States are often not willing to divulge some information that can affect their national security, making verification difficult.

Thus, it becomes necessary to devise ways of doing so. [22]

4. Arms Control and International Cooperation

International collaboration is important to develop efficient means to control AWSs. Using the United Nations and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), States can share their opinions, discuss common standards and develop common approaches to solving issues related to AWSs legally, from humanitarian and security perspectives. [20]

Nevertheless, different national security policies and regulations prevent the formation of an agreement. Therefore, increasing dialogue, exchanging good practices and fostering cooperation among States and international organizations is an important step to take. [23]

Forum	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons	UN General Assembly	Elsewhere in the UN	Outside the UN
Procedure	Operates by consensus	Decisions can be taken by majority vote	Depends on forum	Flexible procedural design
Participation	Decisions made by 128 High Contracting Parties; discussions open to signatories, observer states and other stakeholders	Decisions made by UN member states; open to other stakeholders	Depends on forum; decisions made by UN member states	Voluntary participation; could be multi-stakeholder
Substance	Focus on use of AWS in armed conflict, application and development of international humanitarian law	Discussions to date have addressed international humanitarian law as well as human rights and security concerns	Depends on forum, e.g. human rights, international peace and security, disarmament	Decided by participants
Timing	States to decide next steps at end of 2026	New resolutions on AWS and military AI expected in 2025 but further measures unlikely before conclusion of CCW GGE mandate in 2026	Ongoing	Participant-led; new initiatives unlikely before conclusion of CCW GGE mandate in 2026
Potential outputs	• New protocol • Interpretive guidance • Political declaration	• Legally binding instrument • Resolution(s) • Governance framework	• Resolution(s) • Governance frameworks	• Legally binding instrument • Political declaration • Interpretive guidance • Governance framework

Figure 4.1. A summary of some of the policy directions for advancing international efforts on autonomous weapon systems

AI = artificial intelligence; AWS = autonomous weapon systems; CCW = Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; GGE = Group of Governmental Experts.

F. Current Challenges and International Positions

1. Areas of Agreement and Disagreement

There is a degree of agreement among the States on regulation of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS). There is broad agreement that international humanitarian law applies to these systems and that human accountability must be preserved in decisions involving the use of force. There is also wide agreement on the need to address humanitarian risks and keep the dialog international. [23]

Yet there are still major disagreements over how to define autonomous weapons, how much human control is needed and whether a binding international agreement is required. Some States prefer strict international restrictions, others voluntary codes of conduct and the application of existing legal structures. These differences still make it difficult to find a common approach on how to regulate AWS. [24]

2. Technological and Verification Challenges



The rapid progression of technological development poses great challenges for the assessment of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS). These systems can produce unpredictable results due to inaccurate data, complex software and changing operational environments. This means that their behavior in real-world use may differ from their performance during testing, making reliability difficult to guaranty. [25]

Ensuring the safety and compliance of autonomous systems is equally difficult. Their sophisticated algorithms and sensitive military technology may hinder independent assessment and information sharing. In addition, there are no universally accepted technical standards for testing and evaluation of such systems. Therefore, it is crucial to develop reliable verification methods and common standards to strengthen international arms control. [26]




Figure 2.1. The scope of autonomous weapon systems and AI-enabled decision support systems in the phases of the targeting cycle

3. National Approaches

Different approaches have been taken by countries toward international regulation of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS), in particular on the need for legally binding restrictions and the level of human control. The stances of major military powers are

especially significant as their stances can impact negotiations and advance arms control agreements at the international level.

- **United States**: The United States generally supports regulating autonomous weapons through existing international humanitarian law and national policies, rather than an international prohibition. It stresses responsible development, oversight by humans, and the ability to utilize autonomous technologies for military purposes under the right safeguards. It has also been included in proposals for common rules for the development and use of these systems. [27]

- **China**: China supports international talks on autonomous weapons and has suggested making a distinction between unacceptable systems and those that might be used under some conditions. It opposes a blanket ban on development and production of autonomous weapons, but supports restrictions on some uses. Its approach attempts to address humanitarian concerns without completely restricting technological and military development. [27]

-**Russia**: Russia asserts that existing international humanitarian law is enough to address the challenges of autonomous weapons. It has avoided introducing new legally binding restrictions, saying more regulation could be premature. Russia also refers to the principle of national sovereignty and the right of states to develop military technologies in accordance with their security interests. [28]

- **United Kingdom**: The United Kingdom supports the application of existing international law and emphasizes the importance of human responsibility in the exercise of decisions on the use of force. It tends to favor practical international guidelines and restrictions rather than a general ban. The UK is also engaged in multilateral discussions to clarify how autonomous systems can be used in compliance with international humanitarian law. [29]

- **France**: France supports developing international principles and guidelines that would ensure appropriate human control over autonomous weapons. It has been part of efforts to

develop criteria distinguishing between systems which should be banned due to their inability to conform to international humanitarian law and those which could be allowed subject to strict criteria. France thus prefers a regulatory approach combining humanitarian and legal aspects. [30]

- **Germany**: Germany calls for more international regulation and stresses the significance of human control, accountability and compliance with international humanitarian law. It has been supportive of a two-pronged approach whereby systems that cannot be used in line with international humanitarian law would be banned, while strict criteria would be set for others. Germany cooperates on this matter with several countries in Europe and elsewhere. [30]
- **Brazil**: Brazil is in favor of greater regulation of this technology on the international stage and has been part of the ongoing debate in the CCW. Human control and technical standards are stressed to ensure that this type of technology is used properly. In addition, Brazil has advocated for measures for development of an international instrument to address this issue. [31]

4. Future Arms Control Challenges

The future regulation of AWS is facing some challenges including the fast development of military technologies and the absence of an internationally accepted definition. In the light of constantly developing autonomous technologies, regulation will become a very difficult task. The issue of agreeing upon definitions, human control requirements, and legally binding limitations will definitely become a serious problem for States. [4]

One more challenge is connected with reconciling national security interests with humanitarian interests on an international scale. Discrepancies between States in terms of the range of regulation and its legal nature can make it impossible to conclude an international agreement. Thus, it will be crucial to strengthen diplomacy and define common principles.

[32]

V. Case Studies / Scenarios

This section is for those who wish to conduct research beyond the study guide. - I personally recommend that every delegate review it to feel more at ease during committee proceedings.-

1. United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Lethal Autonomous Weapons (2023)



On December 22, 2023, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/78/241 concerning lethal autonomous weapons systems. The resolution affirmed the applicability of international law to these systems while highlighting the humanitarian, legal, and security risks that autonomous weapons may pose. It was adopted with 152 votes in favor, 4 against, and 11 abstentions.

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4033027/?utm_source=chatgpt.com&v=pdf

2. ICRC's Call for New International Rules (2021)



In 2021, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) called on states to adopt new, binding international rules to address the risks posed by autonomous weapon systems. The ICRC proposed that some systems be completely prohibited, while others should be strictly regulated in terms of human oversight and the conditions under which they may be used.

https://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous-weapons-icrc-recommends-new-rules

3. Accountability for Autonomous Weapon Systems (2022)



A report published by SIPRI in 2022 examines how responsibility should be determined in the event that the use of autonomous weapon systems leads to violations of international humanitarian law. The report addresses the legal frameworks within which the responsibilities of states, military commanders, operators, and other relevant individuals might be assessed. In particular, the fact that machines cannot bear legal responsibility makes the preservation of human accountability a significant subject of debate.

https://www.sipri.org/publications/2022/policy-reports/retaining-human-responsibility-development-and-use-autonomous-weapon-systems-accountability


4. UNIDIR's Research on Lethal Autonomous Weapons



Research published by UNIDIR on autonomous weapon systems reveals that human control is not limited to a single decision made at the moment a system is activated. It examines the significance of the human factor across various stages, including the development and testing of the system, the conditions of its use, and operational oversight. Furthermore, it emphasizes that the predictability and explainability of these systems are essential for effective human control.

https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/UNIDIR-on-Lethal-Autonomous-Weapons-Final.pdf

5. A Hazard to Human Rights: Autonomous Weapons and Digital Decision-Making (2025)



This report, published by Human Rights Watch on April 28, 2025, examines the potential impact of autonomous weapon systems on human rights. It focuses, in particular, on the right to life, non-discrimination, human dignity, and legal accountability. The report further discusses how the increasing difficulty in understanding how algorithmic decisions are reached could complicate the determination of legal responsibility and the investigation of violations.

https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/04/28/a-hazard-to-human-rights/autonomous-weapons-systems-and-digital-decision-making

VI. Questions to Ponder

1. How should the international community establish a common definition of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS), and which systems or autonomous functions should fall under international regulation?
2. What international standards should be established to ensure meaningful human control over the selection and engagement of targets by autonomous weapon systems?
3. Should certain categories of autonomous weapon systems be completely prohibited, while others are permitted under strict international regulations? If so, how should these categories be determined?
4. How can States ensure that responsibility for unlawful actions involving autonomous weapon systems remains clearly assigned to human operators, military commanders, developers and States?
5. What mechanisms can be introduced to monitor the development, testing and deployment of autonomous weapon systems while respecting national security concerns and protecting sensitive military information?
6. How can States prevent autonomous weapon systems from increasing the risk of unintended military escalation, miscalculation and international conflict?
7. How can developed and developing countries cooperate to establish common regulatory standards and prevent an international arms race involving autonomous weapon systems?
8. Should the international community establish a new legally binding agreement specifically addressing autonomous weapon systems, and what obligations,

restrictions and enforcement mechanisms should it include?

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